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Some Thoughts 
on the "BenefitNX Package 
L. Lawrence Schultz 
The author reviews the évidence to see if there is 
gênerai agreement on the définition of fringe benefits and 
examines the difficulties encountered in Computing the 
benefits. 
BACKGROUND 
Fringe benefits became a fixture at the collective bargaining table 
as a resuit of the policies of restraint required of the War Labor Board 
in carrying out its mission of keeping inflation at bay, during the U.S. 
involvement in World War IL The Board, under the leadership of men 
who hâve had a tremendous impact in shaping collective bargaining, 
devised package settlements that included items previously not part of 
the usual union demands or formerly regarded as solely within the pro-
vince of management's right to grant or withhold. 
Immediately after the termination of the conflict of that era, unions 
sought increases in direct wages — for what may be regarded as the 
first round of postwar bargaining. Renewed interest in fringe benefits 
came to the fore in the second round as the Government brought pressure 
to bear on the possibility of demand — induced inflation. Please recall 
contracts of the late 40's were generally for a 12-month term. 
There was thus placed upon the collective bargaining table issues 
for negotiations that approximately 30 years ago amounted to about 5% 
of total rémunération. At présent, a very broad estimate of the per-
centage of payroll labor cost ho-
vers between 23 percent and 30 
percent, depending upon whose 
survey or calculations on is rea-
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ding. One figure that recently caught my eye was the 41.6 percent of 
payroll cost in one of the major utilities in the Eastern United States. 
Apart from attempting to reconcile différences over adding or increasing 
existing benefits, negotiators find ample room to disagree over the cal-
culation of the cost of fringe benefits. 
Parenthetically at this point, whether you accept the low percentage 
figure or the high percentage one, it strongly suggests collective bargaining 
has outgrown continued use of the term « fringe benefit. » 
DIFFERENCES IN DEFINITION AND COMPUTATION 
Let's take this area for discussion in two bites. First, let's review 
to see if there is gênerai agreement on the définition of fringe benefits 
and, secondly, difficultés encountered in Computing the benefits — 
traceable in part to lack of agreement on what is being calculated. 
The uncertainty, initially thrust upon us, in seeking a widely accepted 
ground for benefits is probably created by the abundance of définitions 
given to « wages. » Our expérience in the United States shows that a 
variety of Fédéral statutes related to wages reveal no single application 
of terms. The same holds true at the state level, within any single juris-
diction. 
Moving next to the description of fringe benefits, hear now this 
parade of explanatory efforts : 
— Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, « Glossary 
of Current Industrial Relations and Wage Terms » 
Generally, suppléments to wages received by workers at a 
cost to employers. 
— AFL-CIO American Federationist, June 1970 
Fringe benefits include paid vacations and holidays, health 
and welfare plans, pensions and premium pay for overtime 
and shift work, as well as employer expenditures for legally 
required insurance programs such as Social Security. 
— National Association of Manufacturers, « When Management 
Negotiates » 
More than fifty items classified into six catégories : 
Premium Payments for Time Worked 
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Payments for Spécial Duties 
Payments for Health and Security Benefits 
Payments for Time not Worked 
Payments for Employée Services 
Other Expenditures 
A private industrial relations reporting firm, the Bureau of National 
Affairs, Inc., released an article April 25, 1973, entitled « Employee-
Benefits Plans, 1971. » The author set out : 
« An 'employee-benefit plan,' as defined hère, is any type of plan 
sponsored or initiated unilaterally or jointly by employers or employées 
and providing benefits that stem from the employment relationship 
and that are not underwritten or paid directly by government 
(Fédéral, State, or local). » 
The most récent attempt that has corne to my attention at making 
« fringe benefits easy to understand » (I say that with tongue in cheek) 
is found in a publication by Educators Negotiating Service in their survey, 
« Fringe Benefits in Unionized Community Collèges, » publication date 
November 1, 1972. The authors give us a grouping of fringes as « col-
latéral payments supplementary to the basic wage structure with two 
types of catégories : one, income maintenance, including pay for time 
not worked, premium pay for time worked, pension, and welfare plans. 
Two, perquisites and amenities, including professional improvement be-
nefits and physical and miscellaneous provisions. 
There is no pretense that an ad hoc survey of five sources will make 
a worthwhile contribution to the body of knowledge on the subject. On 
the other hand, the sources do show some universality reached by varied 
pathways. Ail seem to agrée the employer provides payments in two 
district batches. One is a direct payment at regular, proximate points of 
time usually tagged « pay day » by récipients of the direct payment. Thèse 
regular, proximate points of time may occur every seventh day, or four-
teenth day, or spécifie calendar days of each month such as the 15th or 
30th, except obviously in the month of February. Persons for hire in the 
normal course of employment, within this situation, know their présence 
on the job will resuit in whatever amount of income they earn coming 
to them in a constant flow. 
The other type of payment for which employées hâve expectations 
are conditioned upon certain events taking place. An illness to self or 
family, a holiday, vacation period, lay-off, work beyond mormally a 
scheduled period, plant closure. And, if you accept the U.S. National 
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Association of Manufacturers' word for it, some 44 other instances that 
body regards as money paid out for other than direct payments. 
My impression is that economists in most cases group ail rémunér-
ation as wages. At the other end, most legislators hâve amply de-
monstrated a continuing search for the définition of wages, if we are 
bound by the définitions entered into our statutes. Partisans, manage-
ments and unions set out explanations most friendly to their respective 
needs. Those of us falling outside of the aforementioned catégories either 
utilize the terminology created for us or bring into being terms more 
handy for us. Henceforth, référence in this présentation shall be to direct 
and indirect payments. 
Turning attention now to pitfalls of calculating the cost of indirect 
wages. Previously there has been passing référence to the tug between 
unions and management relative to the items embraced by indirect pay-
ments. Now, we find on the management side considération is given to 
each indirect payment received by an employée and paid by management. 
Surveys conducted by both the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association of Manufacturers include items unions would not 
include. Generally, the union goes along with an entire indirect payments 
settlement that covers usual subjects for bargaining but questions costs 
including statutorially required matters or unilaterally granted as a matter 
of management self-interest. 
Divergent perspectives of the purpose of indirect payments may 
create the disagreement. Management looks upon the calculation and 
présentation of total compensation to employées as a very easily discerned 
approach to demonstrating the affirmative advantage of the immédiate 
employer-employée relationship. Their opposite numbers are eager to 
punctuate the gains made by the union at the bargaining table. Inevitably, 
with the opposed purposes, disclosure of labor costs by each side at the 
conclusion of negotiations will show a gap. One side states an expanded 
list of affected items, the other a less inclusive list. 
Tack on another feature that forecloses on the same settlement figure 
being stated by both parties, either in cents per hour or in percentage — 
management input into its computation of the économie package includes 
a loading factor. Other terms for the loading factor are « creep > and 
« rollup. » A relatively brief explanation of the rollup additive by ma-
nagement is the ratio of hourly expenditures on benefits to the straight 
time hourly earnings. The union disregards the loading factor. 
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The union, on this point, is apparently taking the position that pay-
ments for social security, unemployment insurance, workmen's compen-
sation, and other legally required expenditures are the cost of being in 
business with or without the présence of an organized bargaining unit. 
Management, in standing firm on use of the rollup factor, makes no 
attempt to shake the position presented by the union, but déclares in-
creased costs attributable to the outcome of negotiations rightfully are 
an intégral part of the ultimate expense to the company. 
A relevant question arises at this junction — how accurately can 
management détermine its contributions over the term of the contract on 
social security, unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation? 
Ceilings on the taxable earnings base and expérience ratings adjustments 
serve to alter required contributions. The level of employée annual earn-
ings is, perhaps, readily determinable, but the safety record and unem-
ployment expérience is only an anticipated guess. Then, too, social 
security and unemployment insurance taxes will be declining percent of 
payroll as there is an increased number of workers reaching the maximum 
limit on which the employer makes a contribution. 
As an addendum on point, it is interesting to note that in the latter 
part of the 1960s, when the Présidents Council of Economie Advisers 
supported guideline controls, the social security tax costs were not in-
cluded in the définition of employée compensation for the purposes of 
the guideposts. While the Council made the observation such costs affected 
unit labor costs, it recognized the rates and benefits of social security are 
set by law and not by collective bargaining. 
The Economie Stabilization Act of 1970, in both Phase II and III, 
provided that chargeable increases in wages and salaries do not include 
public plans as the social security System and Fédéral Unemployment 
Tax Acts. 
Placing before this assembly noted « clash » points on the gênerai 
issue of indirect wages forces considération of the hurdles that must be 
overcome in working with negotiated retirement plans. One economist 
in an article on pension costs written several years ago stated that 
« changes in pensions are the most difficult to price. » His explanation 
of the difficulties encountered was liberally sprinkled with « estimâtes, » 
« assumptions. » « rough guide. » He is not being taken to task for what 
was really an easily read exploration. On the contrary, the literary effort 
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to which référence is herein made underscores the fact that retirement 
features demand close study and careful préparation. 
From a mediator's chair, pension on the list of proposais., whether 
it's the installation of a new plan or revision of an existing one, generally 
signais the présence of bargainers specifically qualified to wend their way 
through the compexities accepted as pension negotiations. Employment 
of actual cost methods, the Combined Annuity Mortality Table, and 
other seemingly common denominators does not assure that skilled ad-
vocates are addressing each other on the same terms. 
Disagreement of major proportions has sprung from the anticipated 
rate of return on investment. There is no need to probe deeply for the 
cause. Ail of us can generally agrée finance managers (accountants, 
actuaries, trustées) well deserve characterization as « conservative. » 
There is a varying degree of conservatism among those responsible for 
investment of funds. This is underscored by the exchanges that occur 
when discussing return on investments. With a hope of avoiding over-
simplification, there is a distinct feeling that management advisors peg 
the rate of return low, with the union advisors speaking in terms of 
higher figures. This is on a relative basis, of course. There is too much 
expertise represented to hâve either side entirely out of bounds. 
The reason for the careful and intense negotiation on this portion of 
pension planning and administering is uderstandable. As a rule of thumb, 
each miscalculation of VA percent on rate of return créâtes a six percent 
différence in cost. Thus, if a most conservative rate of return is relied 
upon, for example 4VA percent, and the return is 4% percent, the fund 
will require 12 percent less income to provide beneficiaries the scheduled 
income. The investment absorbs a portion of the cost. 
Reacting to circumstances of this nature, unions take the position 
management assumes an obligation to pay a sum certain. Favorable rate 
of return, beyond that estimated, should be grounds for purchasing ad-
ditional benefits and not relieving management of the amount (expressed 
in cents per hour) it had obligated itself to pay for pension benefits. 
Forecasting pension costs can be unsettled by other variances — 
number of employées taking early retirement, influx of females into the 
covered work force, impact of disability retirées, and marked decreases 
or increases in âges of the work unit. 
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There are no ready-made formulae, expérience tested, that can be 
overlaid on ail bargaining encounters. Both sides should be well aware 
that you approach pension negotiations most gingerly. 
Before leaving this portion of my présentation on différences in 
Computing indirect wages, your attention is directed to what should not 
be, but is, another potential hurdle. The matter of annual hours — a 
key ingrédient in establishing the price of a negotiated seulement. 
Does the computation take into account a représentative average 
of a previous time span, the immédiate fiscal period, or an arbitrary 
annual figure ? A method employed to détermine productive man hours 
or plant hours is to add total straighttime hours paid and total overtime 
hours paid, deduct total paid time off hours and divide the annual cost of 
the indirect wage item by the sum. This will then provide the bargainers the 
cost of that particular item expressed in cents per hour. No discomfort 
hère, unless the parties collide on use of the past for calculating future 
cost. Should an estimated annual straight time hours be considered ? On 
the basis of annual hours worked per employée — is it 2000 (guessing 
the average) vacation and holidays hours at 80 hours paid time off, or 
do you factor in 2080 hours, or, as one professor at a Midwestern Uni-
versity recently told me, use 1980 hours (as he put it) a more realistic 
averaging of vacation duration, number of holidays, sick leave pay, and 
absences. 
Relying on my own immédiate expérience I submit that most con-
tract setting out eligibility for vacation and holiday pay generally 
provide a cushion for days of scheduled work missed for no specified 
needs. How accurate then is the use of 2000 annual hours, or 1980, or 
1960? 
At this point one might conclude that costing the indirect wage 
package is flexible estimating. And, that is ail it may be, especially if 
actual expérience establishes costs. There are portions among the package 
that scarcely cause a monetary ripple. For example, accidentai death and 
dismemberment tacked on to group life insurance and a policy covering 
polio. 
A working formula that mediators in the United States use is quite 
simplistic but operational — obtain cost of the item average number of 
hours worked per year, and the number of employées in the covered unit. 
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Divide the annual cost by the product of average annual number of hours 
times the number of employées. 
If the principals to a dispute want to work with more exacting cal-
culations, each side generally introduces the mediator to its computational 
results and methodology. 
If there are major déviations from generally accepted practices, the 
mediator should state that he has noted them and provide a judgment as 
to the possible impact on the progress or hindrance of negotiations, based 
on what he has observed. His action may in no way deter use of widely 
separated procédures. It does, nonetheless, serve as a precautionary notice 
that the method by which the figures were determined may become a nego-
tiating issue that will be fiercely contested. 
A development that must be acknowledged is the growing utilization 
of minicomputers at the bargaining table, including duplication of the 
tapes for on-the-spot review. It is much too récent an introduction to 
comment on whether the collective bargaining process is being materially 
aided. 
BENEFIT PACKAGE, FOR WHOM ? 
It would stretch my own sensé of belief if I thought « costing of 
fringe benefits » was to be interpreted only with a mathematical 
connotation. The emphasis from hère forward is to be on the word 
« benefits. » The question is posed — benefit package — for whom ? In 
getting off the mark on this question, a quote from the textbook, Fringe 
Benefits, Labour Costs, and Social Security, edited by Reid and Robertson 
of the University of Glasgow : 
« The term 'fringe benefits' has a somewhat puzzling and fanciful 
aspect to the uninitiated, and even to those who use it frequently 
it is elusive and diverse în its meaning. » 
Note please the book features « Social Security » along with benefits 
and costs. There is justification for the title, though the work is not 
necessarily a pathfinder in that respect. Scan auxiliary terms for fringe 
benefits. 
The International Labour Office, employs social charges and other 
éléments of labour costs ; Britain, related éléments to labour costs, 
«perks » (abbreviation for perquisites), welfare costs, side benefits, and 
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social service benefits ; France, social wages ; Canada, supplementary 
wage provisions, unseen pay checks (given today's circumstances the 
« unseen » bit may well be applicable on the broadest possible scale), 
social benefits, marginal benefits. 
You hâve been previously provided with a wholesale listing of 
définitions in the United States. 
Threading its way through the expressions, other than fringe benefits, 
is — social wages, social charges, social service benefits, social benefits. 
Indirect wage payments must be presumed to add a dimension to an 
employee's life that does not flow from the direct wage payment. A di-
mension that in part must be implied to offer a somewhat fuller security 
in facing the unexpected or the normally jolting expériences. To a great 
extent indirect wage payments meet that objective. Yet, there is a cadre 
of social science scholars who offer a contrary view, and I intend to 
return to that a bit later. 
Hère and now, if had to respond to the query — Benefits Package, 
for Whom ? — your answer would probably be — the employées. Is that 
entirely right ? Isn't it likely there are several answers to the question ? 
Regardless of how partisan one may be, it must be granted that 
management expects a favorable response to flow to the enterprise as a 
conséquence of providing indirect payments. Furthermore, the spécifie 
expectation on managements part may vary over a period of time. This 
essentially is what T. J. Gordon indicates in his three-part séries, entitled 
« Study of Potential Changes in Employée Benefits. » Gordon regards 
the management main target as shifting throughout the historical devel-
opment and growth of the benefit pattern. Ail of us can accept the 
premise that management wants to reap gains. There's nothing diabolic 
about this anticipation. Gordon sets out the initial willingness by manage-
ment to start the benefit package was to prove itself as a considerate 
employer. As the union movement gained strength, the reason probably 
was the création of a buffer against organizing. This in turn was followed 
by the lack of choice during the war-time constraints. Growth in indirect 
wage payments next leaped forward as union negotiators focused on them. 
As the economy reacted to the demands made upon it (a time frame 
référence would probably be the 50s and 60s), labor supply lagged 
behind demand. Management was encouraged to offer employées an 
attractive, encompassing economy grouping. Next, an altération of the 
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tax structure stimulated management in the form of advantages for spécial 
funds and trust plans. 
The aforementioned are partial explanations. A raw guess would 
be that at times a single reason may stand out, but in the main, the 
ability to attract employées, retain and stimulate productive employées, 
and properly utilize ail sound business techniques available remain as 
constant factors. 
Managements anticipated return on both its direct and indirect pay-
ments to employées, in this décade of the 70's, faces the contemporary 
compensation théories. It is my understanding that social scientists giving 
their attention to this area seem to be running parallel to the advocates 
of « humanizing the work place » and « job enrichment. » Perhaps one 
body is encouraging the other. The common thread between them appears 
to be an acceptance that the compensation System of an organization is 
ant interrelated structure in which direct and indirect wage payments are 
only a portion of the éléments involved. A leading proponent of the 
thought that contemporary compensation must be a meld of both the 
traditional wage and supplementary benefit rewards and the niotivation-
to-work theory is Dr. Frederick Herzberg of the University of Utah. 
Essentially Herzberg, at least my interprétation of Herzberg, is 
saying that pay, and supplemental benefits, along with supervisory be-
havior, work rules are not the motivating factors. He sees motivators as 
achievement, responsibility, growth and récognition. 
Even if you désire to completely ignore the Herzberg theory and 
simply rely on « gut » reaction, you would be forced to the conclusion 
that a high level of rémunération does not alone guarantee an employée 
will provide increased and improved productivity performance. There is 
no intent hère to suggest the indirect wage payment should be dropped 
or diminished. I am suggesting that negotiators on this issue lift their 
sights beyond the cents per hour or percentage of increase. 
Permit me to suggest several ways to square the indirect wage pay-
ments with the objectives of the employée, the union, and management. 
First, I believe the level of sophistication at the bargaining table, the 
needs of those directly affected, and the required informational apparatus 
is available to provide individualized indirect wage payments. A flexible 
individualized package that can adjust to serve the very personal needs 
of each employée through the various stages of life he'U pass during the 
course of his employment. 
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Why the same plan for the young, single employée as the married 
employée nearing retirement? Why not a plan for the employée with 
several youngsters of collège âge with an immédiate need for covering 
tuition costs ? The objectives for a father of three young toddlers is dif-
férent than his co-worker with the teenagers. How about the employée 
with two youngsters with allergies, the fellow who would like to hâve a 
detailed retirement plan that surpasses what is available now ? 
Is there really anything that reaches behind the realm of possibility 
in thinking about an individual account from which each employée can 
pièce together an overall plan that best covers his needs ? Is it really 
administrative^ difficult, how misshapen will expérience tables become, 
isn't the state of the electronic data processing art advanced enough to 
provide adéquate assistance, and what about the end-result — isn't it 
possible the employée will consider himself being treated as an individual ? 
There are two related proposais that attend the suggestion of the 
individualized indirect wage package. One advances thought that nego-
tiations on indirect wages be separated from the main table. There are 
many satisfactory plans. There are also a host of patchwork packages 
that only appear bénéficiai in a total monetary settlement. Perhaps more 
than any other cluster of negotiating issues, bargaining on indirect wages 
has repeated referral to resources that can be proposed and candidly 
discussed by the negotiators. There can be far more objectivity as accom-
panying data is viewed, exchanged, and discussed between the parties. 
The second proposai that flows from the thought of individual plans 
has référence to resolution techniques for dispute that arise as a resuit 
of negotiations on indirect wages. If you accept the premise that items 
generally grouped under the heading of indirect wages can be factually 
supported with available statisticts and tables, then it is not too far a 
step to the suggestion that it be required of he disputants to submit to 
an impartial fact-finding body when a bona fide deadlock ensues. 
Réflexions sur les avantages d'appoint 
Suivant l'auteur, l'introduction dans les conventions collectives aux États-Unis 
de dispositions relatives aux avantages d'appoint remonte à l'époque de la guerre, 
alors que le Conseil du travail en temps de guerre (War Labor Board) encouragea 
cette formule qui permettait de freiner l'inflation. Auparavant, les syndicats ne 
présentaient guère de revendications de cette nature, les employeurs estimant que 
de tels avantages relevaient strictement de leurs droits de direction. 
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Il y a trente ans, les avantages d'appoint équivalaient à cinq pour cent environ 
du coût du travail ; aujourd'hui, on les estime en moyenne entre 23 et 30 pour cent 
de ce coût. 
Même, après tout ce temps, on ne s'entend pas encore sur la terminologie. 
L'expression « avantages d'appoint » n'a pas la même signification selon qu'il s'agit 
des syndicats, des employeurs ou des agences politiques. Au fond, l'imbroglio vient 
de ce que l'on n'est pas unanime sur la définition du salaire. Pour les uns, le salaire 
c'est ce que l'employé reçoit dans son enveloppe de paie chaque semaine. C'est là 
le point de vue des syndicats d'une façon générale. Les employeurs sont enclins à 
y ajouter tout ce qui entre dans le coût du travail. Quant aux fonctionnaires du 
travail, ils sont portés à faire certaines distinctions. 
On peut en tout cas diviser les avantages d'appoint en deux catégories : ceux 
qui visent à maintenir le revenu de l'employé et ceux qui leur procurent des revenant-
bon et des agréments, tout comme pour ce qui est des salaires, on parlera de 
salaires directs et de salaires indirects. C'est une formule commode, celle qu'il 
convient d'utiliser lorsqu'il s'agit de s'engager dans le calcul du coût des avantages 
sociaux, c'est-à-dire du salaire indirect. 
Quel est le contenu du salaire indirect ? Pour les employeurs, il s'agit de 
tout argent qui est reçu par le travailleur et payé par l'employeur. Les syndicats 
considèrent comme salaire indirect les mesures qui font l'objet de négociations et 
qui sont garanties par les dispositions des conventions collectives. C'est là un sujet 
de désaccord entre les parties. L'employeur a tendance à faire ressortir tout le 
coût du travail tandis que le syndicat met l'accent sur les gains qu'il obtient à la 
table des négociations. Ceci conduit inévitablement à une interprétation différente 
du coût des avantages sociaux selon que l'on se trouve d'un côté ou de l'autre 
de la table. Quand il s'agit d'en apprécier le coût horaire, le cahier des charges 
est toujours plus élevé du côté de l'employeur. 
Les syndicats considèrent que les sommes versées à la sécurité sociale, à la 
protection contre le chômage et les accidents du travail sont le prix que doit 
payer l'employeur du seul fait qu'il est employeur, peu importe qu'il doive ou non 
traiter avec un syndicat accrédité. D'autre part, sans contredire en principe le 
point de vue des syndicats, les employeurs déclarent que toute augmentation d'où 
qu'elle vienne fait partie intégrante des coûts pour l'entreprise. À ce propos, il 
convient de noter que, dans l'établissement de lignes directrices en matière de 
salaire, le Comité des conseillers économiques du Président (Présidents Council 
of Economie Advisers) n'a pas jugé bon de retenir le coût des différentes mesures 
de sécurité sociale auxquelles les employeurs contribuaient. Le coût de certaines 
mesures de sécurité sociale ne se laisse pas facilement évaluer. Quand il s'agit 
de l'établissement ou de la révision d'un régime de retraite, le rôle du médiateur 
devient d'autant plus délicat que les parties ont recours à des spécialistes, actuaires, 
comptables et fiduciaires, qui sont enclins à se montrer plutôt prudents lorsqu'ils 
ont à se prononcer sur le rendement des capitaux. Une erreur d'une demie de un 
pour cent dans l'appréciation du rendement du capital, 43A p.c. par exemple, alors 
qu'on avait prévu un rendement de AVA p.c. seulement, exigera des déboursés de 12 
pour cent de moins pour assurer à ses bénéficiaires le revenu convenu. Voilà qui 
peut, en certains cas, représenter un beau magot. D'autres facteurs impondérables 
861 
exercent également une influence, comme la retraite prématurée, l'importance de 
la main-d'oeuvre féminine, etc. 
Un autre problème qui se soulève, surtout quand il est nécessaire d'apprécier 
le coût des vacances payées, des congés payés, des absences rémunérées, c'est le 
choix du nombre moyen des heures travaillées au cours d'une année. Selon que 
l'on fonde le calcul sur 2,080, 2,000 ou 1,980 heures par année, on arrivera à des 
résultats passablement différents. 
Dans la deuxième partie de son travail, l'auteur se demande : pour qui les 
avantages d'appoint. La réponse qui vient le plus naturellement à l'esprit, c'est de 
dire qu'ils sont pour les employés. Mais on peut se demander si cela est entièrement 
vrai. C'est là une question à laquelle on peut donner plusieurs réponses. Ceci 
ressort même du vocabulaire utilisé pour les désigner. Suivant les circonstances et 
les milieux, on parlera de coûts sociaux, de revenant-bon, d'avantages d'appoint, 
d'avantages de sécurité sociale, de salaires sociaux, de suppléments aux salaires. 
Certes, on peut présumer que les salaires indirects visent à améliorer les 
conditions de vie des employés, mais certains sociologues sont d'un avis contraire. 
Il faut considérer que les employeurs veulent aussi y avoir leur compte, recueillir 
leur part de la récolte : se donner une bonne réputation, éloigner les syndicats, 
attirer la main-d'oeuvre, profiter d'avantages fiscaux intéressants, conserver leurs 
meilleurs employés. Ce ne sont là sans doute qu'explications fragmentaires, mais 
on ne peut les ignorer. Au fond, les partisans d'avantages d'appoint plus intéressants 
s'inspirent des mêmes motifs que les avocats des mouvements en faveur de l'huma-
nisation du travail et de la valorisation des emplois. Deux buts sont recherchés 
selon qu'on les reçoit ou qu'on les accorde : apporter aux travailleurs certains 
avantages et stimuler la motivation au travail. 
Tous les auteurs ne sont pas d'avis que les avantages d'appoint constituent 
des éléments valables de motivation au travail, ce qui ne signifie pas qu'ils doivent 
être diminués ni supprimés, mais tout simplement que, sur ce point, les négociateurs 
doivent regarder au-delà des gains en argent. S'il y a une suggestion à formuler, 
c'est que les différentes formes d'avantages sociaux soient adaptées aux besoins des 
travailleurs au fur et à mesure du déroulement de leur vie professionnelle. Par 
exemple, pourquoi un régime de retraite identique pour les jeunes travailleurs, les 
célibataires et les personnes qui sont sur le point d'abandonner le marché du 
travail ? Les besoins du père dont la famille comptent trois bambins ne sont pas 
les mêmes que ceux du père de trois grands adolescents. En bref, ne faut-il pas 
s'efforcer d'individualiser les avantages sociaux de telle sorte que les travailleurs 
se rendent compte que leur situation personnelle signifie vraiment quelque chose. 
En ce sens, ne serait-il pas possible de discuter les questions relatives au salaire 
indirect à une table de négociation spéciale. Les parties, libérées de la recherche 
du gain et de la hantise du coût des avantages sociaux, pourraient discuter ces 
sujets avec plus de sérénité et plus d'ouverture d'esprit. De même, il leur serait 
plus facile de faire appel à une commission d'arbitrage en cas de désaccord. 
